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Abstract. Randomness plays a central rol in the quantum mechanical description of our
interactions. We review the relationship between the violation of Bell inequalities, non signaling
and randomness. We discuss the challenge in defining a random string, and show that
algorithmic information theory provides a necessary condition for randomness using Borel
normality. We close with a view on incomputablity and its implications in physics.
1. Introduction
The empirical success of quantum mechanics in the description of microscopic phenomena is
indeed impressive. We visualize matter as made of molecules, formed by atoms with electrons
orbiting around a nucleus with protons and neutrons, which are built with quarks, bound
together by interaction carriers, like gluons, pions and photons. The mathematical formalism
allows the description of element formation inside the stars, the structure of materials, the
energetic collisions which take place in many scenarios including high-energy accelerators. A
plethora of new technologies, devices, materials, has born out of it.
At the same time, quantum physics has put at the reach of our hands the limitations of
our imagination, of our capacity to describe employing words this microscopic world. The very
notion of reality is waning, despite many efforts on the opposite direction. Particles and waves
are two central notions of the classical description of the physical world. They are associated
with the objects, formed by particles, and the interactions between them, whose perturbations
propagate as waves. Particles are localized, waves have extended fronts. A century of wave-
particle duality has messed it all. The violation of the Bell inequalities opened a Pandora’s
box. If we insist in having well defined objects in the quantum domain, they must have very
strange properties: a measurement of an observable property in one part of a quantum system
is correlated with the outcome of a different measurement realized in other part of the system
in a way which can be described as non-local, contextual and at random. This property, called
entanglement, is found in most composed quantum systems. Good overviews on these subjects
were published associated with the 50 years of Bell’s theorem [1, 2].
By non-local it is implied that the correlations in the outcomes of the measurements are
obtained in space-time regions which are causally disconnected, i.e. no signal traveling at most
at the velocity of light in vacuum can be sent from one region to the other. Contextual refers to
a connection between the measurement device and the property to be measured. The quantum
formalism associates observables with expectation values of non-commuting operators, implying
the uncertainty principle. The better the value of one observable is known, the lesser we can
say about the other. More than that, if these complementary properties are assumed to have
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definite but unknown values when they are not measured, flat contradictions appear in their
description. The simplest way to avoid these contradictions is to assume that, if these properties
exist at all, they manifest themselves in accordance to the measurement device, the context in
which the experiment is performed.
If the quantum correlations are associated with quantum objects, they must have non-local
and contextual properties. What would prevent us to employ contextuality, measuring in a given
way one part of quantum system to generate through the non-local correlation a specific outcome
of the measurement in the other part, far away, sending in this way a signal faster than light?
We cannot do that, because we can select the property to be measured, but cannot influence
the outcome: it is either trivial, when we measure a property which was already prepared to
have a specific value, or random, when we measure a complementary property.
We can see that randomness is an imprescindible companion of non-locality and contextuality,
if no-signaling (the short name of the impossibility to send information faster than light in
vacuum) would be enforced. And we really want it, because special relativity tells us that being
able to send information between causally disconnected space-time regions is equivalent to send
information back in time is some reference frames. And this would cause logical paradoxes which
would demolish the basics of science as we know them.
When instead of thinking about objects and their interactions, the quantum system is
analyzed from the information perspective, interesting alternative views arise. Reality and
information can be considered as two sides of the same coin. Randomness, complementarity and
entanglement emerge from the fact that from individual measurements there is a finite amount
of information available. One way to formalize this ideas is to postulate that an elementary
system can only give a definite result in one specific measurement. It follows that the outcomes
of other independent measurements must be irreducibly random [3].
When the intrinsic quality of quantum randomness is accepted as a postulate, a world of
applications emerges. “Private randomness” is defined by the presence of correlations that
cannot be reproduced with local variables. It is quantified by the violation of Bell inequalities,
and is associated with the impossibility to predict a given string employing a classical computer
and classical information [4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
The concept of probability is associated with quantum predictions through the Born rule:
the square of the wave function provides the probability density of observing a given event. It
is associated with an intrinsic quantum randomness. Employing composite systems, like pairs
of entangled photons, the violation of Bell inequalities guarantees their quantum origin. It is
assumed to imply that the information generated with their measurements did no exist before
them, certifying their privacy, and that they are “as random as they can be”.
Can we prove that a sequence of measurements is already random? This is a challenging
question, whose answer is explored in the following section.
2. Randomness
How can be know that a given series of numbers is random? Suppose we give you the sequence
“1,5,7,0,7”. It looks pretty random, and maybe you accept it as a good candidate for a sequence
of random numbers: But if we give you the numbers “1,2,3,4,5,6” instead; you can say: “Well,
that’s not random, you are just counting”. We offer you the sequence “2,4,6,8,1,0,1,2”; and you
answer: “you are saying the same numbers times two!”. With our best effort we come with the
sequence “1,1,2,3,5,8” and irritated you say: “That’s the beginning of the Fibonacci sequence!”.
Even if you accepted the first sequence as random, we may say it is not, a closer look reveals
that it contains the first digits of pi/2.
It looks like we can always find a way to argue that a sequence is not random. The sequences
above are “easy”, but take “8,3,2,0,9”; it does not seem to have a pattern and if we say something
like: take the first digit and add -5, then add -1, then -2 and finally add 9, it may look like we
just made that up. So what descriptions can be considered as patterns?
The notion of randomness in this context is “the absence of a pattern”. The idea of pattern
refers to a procedure that describes the string. Such a procedure doesn’t need any kind of
decision or creativity, is just a set of instructions that need to be followed to reproduce the
string in an “algorithmic” way [9].
2.1. Turing Machines
One of the greatest achievements in the past century was the formalization of the algorithmic
procedures, this was done in many different ways and all of them turn out to be equivalent. The
most intuitive one is due to Alan M. Turing and is called “Turing Machines”[10]. An excellent
exposure of this subject can be find in [11].
A Turing machine can be seen as a man following a set of rules, this man can read and write
in a boundless (we don’t want to limit the amount of paper he can use) tape divided in squares,
every square can have only one symbol at a time. He can read only one symbol at a time and,
depending on that symbol and the current state of mind (“memory and thoughts”) he will write
another symbol, change his state of mind and move to the left or right.1
This definition may seem abstract. However, nowadays we are so used to manipulate
computers that another way to make this a comprehensible definition is to associate a Turing
machine with a general purpose computer which has an infinite amount of memory (because
the tape is boundless), running a specific program. This brings an interesting question: Is
there a Turing machine that can be identified with a general purpose computer running any
program? Yes, this is a really important class of machines called Universal Turing Machines
(UTM). Every UTM can “run” every possible program, i.e. can mimic the behavior of every
other Turing machine. This is done with the proper input, in the same way a general purpose
computer can “run” every algorithm, which must be written in an appropriate code. Therefore,
for every machine M with input i must exist an input x such that a UTM U(x) can imitate
M(i) when is feed with x, and therefore M(i) = U(x).
2.2. Information, Randomness and Turing machines.
The existence of a UTM is very important for our purposes. We cannot take a Turing machine
as a description of a pattern, because for every finite sequence we can make a Turing machine
whose output is the sequence. Just take a program that says something like
print “0111001...”
(putting the sequence as argument of ’print’). In this way we can always find an algorithm that
prints the sequence. The trick is simple: the sequence is contained in the program. But then,
the number of symbols needed to print the sequence is by necessity larger than the sequence
itself.
We can make contact with the intuition suggested above: when a pattern gets really
complicated we think that it should not be considered as a pattern. In the realm of algorithms
we can say: if the program is longer than the sequence itself that’s not a pattern. This gives us
the opportunity to define a pattern in a sequence as a program, whose output is the sequence,
with fewer symbols than the sequence. The sequences without patterns as those we want to call
random.
1 The way to formalize memory and thoughts is just by defining a finite set of states {qi}. Every time the
machine makes an operation the state of the machine changes to another state qj . The concept of state of mind
can be applied to machines too. In the case of a calculator made with gears this states describe the physical state
of the gears.
Our relation with computers provides us with a familiar example, where the key concept
is compression. We employ many compression algorithms, like zip, to save space in the hard
drive or send information faster. We can identify the strings that does have patterns with the
compressible ones, because there is an algorithm whose output is the string. It offers a very
good intuition about random strings: A random string cannot be compressed.
It may seem hard to find a random string but that’s not the case. As an example take all
the binary strings with 3 symbols, there are 8 of them. And there are only 6 strings shorter: 2
binary strings with one symbol (0 and 1), and 4 with two symbols (00, 01, 10 and 11). If we try
to represent the binary strings with 3 symbols with shorter strings, at least two of them cannot
be included, therefore there are at least 2 random strings. Algorithms are programs in a given
language, which are represented by binary strings also. This argument can be applied to any
number of symbols, implying that random strings are quite common.
2.3. Algorithmic information theory
The algorithmic information theory[9, 12, 13] was developed in the past century by Andrey
Kolmogorov, Ray Solomonoff, Gregory Chaitin and others. Within this theoretical framework
we can, instead of just talking about random and non-random strings, ask: what is the smallest
number of symbols necessary to print a given sequence? For example, take the sequence made
of ’1’ a million times. This sequence have a million symbols but it will be very simple to write
a program to print it, and such a program will easily have less than a million symbols.
The least number of symbols is called the algorithmic information content of the sequence.
Random sequences have, by definition, an information content close to their length. Other
mathematical objects, like real numbers, can be identified with a binary sequences using their
binary expansion. In this way we can define the algorithmic information in a real number. It
is worth to mention that the paper in which Turing introduce Turing machines is dedicated to
computable numbers, showing the most real numbers are incomputable.
With this formalism we can investigate randomness, in the way we have just defined it.
Can we use it to construct an algorithm able to classify strings in random and non-random?
Unfortunately, this is not possible. The demonstration is simple.
Suppose we have a method to distinguish between random and non-random strings, and this
method is algorithmic, so can be written as a program and feed to a UTM. To complement it,
we write another piece of code whose output contains all the possible strings, one by one, in
order, i.e. 0,1,00,01,10,00,... . With these programs we can make another program following
these steps:
(i) produce a sequence,
(ii) check if the sequence is random,
(iii) if it is random print it,
(iv) go to (i).
The outcome of these instructions is a sequence of random strings, all of them in order of
length. Suppose the length of this new program is L symbols, this program will eventually print
a random string of L + 1 symbols. But then we have just printed a random sequence of L + 1
symbols with less than L+1 symbols! This contradicts the definition of algorithmic randomness,
therefore there cannot exist an algorithm that can decide the randomness of a string.
2.4. Prefix free strings and the Omega number
The algorithmic information theory have changed over time and today is really common to
find it as prefix-free algorithmic information theory, where prefix-free is referred to the possible
programs accepted by the UTM. For instance, if the UTM accepts “1000” as a program, then
Figure 1. All possible binary string ordered in a tree structure.
the string “10001”, or any other starting with “1000”, can’t be accepted. In the figure 1 we
represent all the possible binary strings, showing explicitly the first three lines, containing the
sequences with 1, 2 and 3 symbols, respectively. Below every string we find all the possible
extensions of this string. If a string is accepted as a program, all the possible strings below it
can’t be accepted as programs.
A schematic procedure to obtain the accepted programs could be this: we have a coin and
want to produce a program by flipping it several times, following these steps:
(i) Flip a coin.
(ii) Incorporate the output (0 or 1) at the end of the string you already have.
(iii) Check if the string of results is an accepted program.
(iv) if it is accepted, halt; if not go to (i).
Note that we are not missing any possible program, because every time we obtain an accepted
program, it closes a branch of the tree in Fig. 1. We are not allowed to continue adding new
symbols to this string (because of the prefix-free condition), and must start building a new
string from its first symbol. For those of us who are familiar with programming, this step is
like compiling the code in a given programming language, and checking if it compiles, i.e. is an
accepted program, or not. Each different string of length n has a probability Pi =
1
2n of being
generated. The prefix-free condition guarantees that
∑
i=possible programs P (i) = 1.
Once we have an accepted program, which in this view includes all the input data files, the
next question is: will it generate an output? Which is equivalent to the question: will this
program stop, or will it be running forever? Running a program we can learn if it halts, in
the event it halts. The problem is to decide when to give up on a program that does not
halt. While many special cases can be answered, Turing demonstrated that a general solution
is impossible. No algorithm, no mathematical theory, can ever tell us which programs will halt.
The demonstration goes in the following direction: Suppose there is an algorithm that takes the
description of a Turing machine and some input x, this algorithm does not halt if the machine
halt when is feed with the input x and halt if the machine will be running forever. Because
this is an algorithm there must be a Turing machine that formalize this, and we can feed this
algorithm with its own description, and because of the way we define it this machine does not
halt if it halts, which is an obvious contradiction. Therefore there cannot exist an algorithm
able to decide if a Turing machine will halt. This is known as the halting problem, and is closely
related with Go¨del’s theorem, which states that there is an infinite number of true statements
in Mathematics which cannot be formally proved [9].
Chaitin considered the ensamble of all possible programs, and asked the question: What is
the probability of getting a halting program choosed at random from the ensamble, as outlined
in the example given above? If we can associate to each accepted program i a function defined as
H(i) = 1 is the program halts, and H(i) = 0 if not, we can evaluate the probability of obtaining
a halting program for a given Universal Turing Machine U as
ΩU =
∑
i=possible programs
H(i)P (i) =
∑
i=possible programs
H(i)
1
2n(i)
where n(i) is the number of bits (symbols in the general case) in the program i. ΩU is called
the Chaitin’s Omega number for U.
Omega is perfectly well defined. It is a specific number which can have a value between zero
and one (is a probability), but it is impossible to compute in its entirety. Some of its first digits
can be calculated. For example, if the computer programs 1, 00 and 010 halt in a given universal
Turing Machine, the first digits of this ΩU would be 0.111. But the relevant aspect is that the
first N digits of ΩU cannot be computed using a program significantly shorter than N bits long.
In this sense, any ΩU has an infinite number of bits which are well and uniquely defined, but
cannot be calculated by any finite program [9]. It does not matter how long is the program, the
number of bits which are impossible to calculate is infinite. It is worth to mention that ΩU is
completely different from some irrational numbers, like pi or
√
2, for whom billions of digits can
be computed with quite compact programs [14].
The consequences of the impossibility to compute ΩU go far beyond computational sciences.
Together with the findings of Go¨del and Turing, they demonstrate that, given any finite set of
axioms, there is an infinite number of truths that are unprovable in that system. It implies
directly that an infinite number of mathematical true statements are impossible to prove, they
must be assumed as new axioms, without any justification. Philosophically, we are touching the
limits of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything happens for a reason or,
in other words, if something is true, there must be a reason for that. In mathematics most of
what is true has no reason at all [9].
3. Randomness in physics and Borel normality
The close connection between the previous section and the foundation of physics can be seen
in the following quote “The discovery that individual events are irreducibly random is probably
one of the most significant findings of the twentieth century. ... for the individual event in
quantum physics, not only do we not know the cause, there is no cause. The instant when a
radioactive atom decays, or the path taken by a photon behind a half-silvered beamsplitter are
objectively random ”[15].
In physics we employ the concept of random in different contexts. Sometimes we say
something is random when we ignore the state of the system, sometimes when the behavior
of the system is really complicated (that’s really close to the previous definitions), and finally
we have intrinsic randomness, applied to individual quantum systems where we can’t, in general,
predict the result of individual measurement outcomes.
What we mean when we say something is unpredictable? In the case of quantum systems
we say that because the result of individual measurements are not, in general, in a one to one
relation with the conditions of the experiment. One could say that there are other parameters
(known as hidden variables) that determine the outcome, but thanks to the so called no-go
theorems, e.g. Bell’s theorem[16], Kochen-Specker[17], etc., this is unlikely to be the case. The
most accepted interpretation, at least in the area of quantum information, is that the result of
any individual measurement is “created” in the act of measurement. This assumption provides
the basis of quantum random number generation, certified using Bell-type inequalities[18, 19].
We are confronted with two different concepts of randomness, the first one related with
algorithmic information theory that define a random sequence as a incompressible one, and the
second one related with unpredictability of measurements. On one side they are similar because,
if a sequence is incompressible, it has no patterns at all and if we can’t predict something
is because there are no regularities or patterns that we can use to predict the result of the
measurement. On the other side the word random is used, in the first case, to describe a
property of sequences of numbers while the second one is applied to single experiments where
each measurement gives us a number.
Can we relate both concepts? Imagine we make a series of measurements of polarization of
photons, assigning a 1 if we get vertical polarization and a 0 in the other case, and put all the
results together forming a string. Is the final sequence compressible? It will depend on the initial
state the photons were prepared. If we prepare all of them in a similar vertical polarization |1〉,
we can predict that we will measure a sequence like “11111...1” that is very compressible. If we
prepare the photons in the state 110 |0〉 +
√
99
10 |1〉, even though we don’t know the result of any
measurement in advance, we can anticipate that the outputs will form a compressible sequence.
Suppose we get something like:
“1111111011111111111011111111011111111111111111111111101111111010...”
where the ratio between zeroes and ones is 199 . We can compress this sequence by writing the
number of 1 instead of 1 themselves, like this:
“70110802407010...”
We can reconstruct the original sequence just by replacing a number between zeroes by its
equivalent in ones, and to perform this translation doesn’t need too much code.
Due to the fact we can compress sequences with more ones than zeroes (or more zeroes than
ones), both must appear the same number of times. Therefore the most incompressible sequence
must have the form:
|0〉+ eiθ |1〉√
2
.
In this case there is no obvious way to compress the sequence. While there is no algorithm
able to test the compressibility, we can use another condition related to compressibility. From
the examples above it is clear that we need equal number of zeroes and ones; but suppose you
split the sequences every two symbols:
“11 10 11 01 11 11 11 01 1101 ...”
Employing the same arguments of compressibility, we must ask for this number to be random
that all two-symbol subsequences appear the same number of times. Let N(x, y) be the number
of occurrences of the substring y in the string x then we need:
N(x, “0”) ≈ N(x, “1”) ≈ L1
2
,
where L is the length in bits of the sequence; and
N(x, “00”) ≈ N(x, “01”) ≈ N(x, “10”) ≈ N(x, “11”) ≈ L
2
1
4
,
as we have L/2 subsequences of two symbols, each one with probability 14 . The general expression
is:
N(x, y) ≈ L
n
1
2n
,
where n is the length in bits of “y”. And therefore:∣∣∣∣N(x, y)L/n − 12n
∣∣∣∣ < 
where  is a “small” number.
C. Calude showed in [20] the relation between the previous ideas and incompressibility. The
proposal is to select
 =
√
log L
L
,
where again L is the length of the sequence, and check the above inequality to all subsequences
shorter, in bits, than log(log(L)). If for all subsequences the inequality is satisfied we will say
the sequence is Borel normal2. In [20] is proved that almost all incompressible sequences are
Borel normal.
Borel normality is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, to incompressibility. An example
of a Borel normal sequence that can be compressed is :
0100011011000001010011100101110111...
which is called the Champernowne’s constant, built with all binary numbers put in order and
forming a single string (0, 1, 00, 01, 10, 11, ...). It was the first example of a Borel normal
number, later is was realized that almost all numbers are normal numbers.
Even though we cannot compare effectively the relation between unpredictability and
incompressibility or randomness, we can compare Borel normality and unpredictability in a
sequence of individual measurement outcomes.
The concepts of Borel normality and incomputablity inspired a comparison between quantum
and computer generated random sequences. While quantum randomness can be proven
incomputable; that is, it is not exactly reproducible by any algorithm, software-generated
random numbers, known as pseudo-random, can be reproduced if the computer code and the
seed are known. Calude et al. [21] performed finite tests of randomness inspired by algorithmic
information theory. They report that all tests produced evidence -with different degrees of
statistical significance- of differences between quantum and non-quantum sources. But in a
recent investigation of randomness in ten sequences of bits generated from the differences between
detection times of photon pairs generated by spontaneous parametric downconversion, they are
found fulfilling the randomness criteria without difficulties [22]. A deeper study is being carried
out to clarify this point.
4. Computability and undecidability
We have explored the close relationship between quantum physics and randomness, the definition
of random as the absence of a pattern, the association of a pattern with an algorithm, and,
through algorithmic information theory, with Borel normality, arriving at a necessary condition
for a string to be random which has been employed to analyze the randomness of sequences of
photon detections.
We can now go a step forward, and explore the relation between physical laws, algorithms
and their computability. As algorithms can be mapped to Turing machines, programs built
with finite alphabets, they are infinitely many but numerables. The set of rational numbers is
also infinite numerable, but the real numbers are non-numerable infinite. It follows that the
absolute majority of irrational numbers are incomputable in principle: it is impossible to write a
computer code to evaluate any of them. It is also impossible to name them, even trying to write
a full encyclopedia devoted to each of them is worthless. This concept if thrilling for some of us.
It invites to question the meaning of the physical theories, which associate physical observables
with real numbers. But, has it any practical implication, or is just a curious but irrelevant
information?
2 This definition is related with the normal numbers E. Borel defined.
A physical law can be seen as a pattern, a regularity which can be described with a
mathematical equation relating measurable quantities. It is assumed that the equation can
be solved, given a set of initial or boundary conditions, and the solutions provide predictions
for the future behavior of the system. Any practitioner has found the practical difficulties in
doing so. In many cases the dimensions of the basis in which the solution must be expressed are
huge, exceeding the ever growing capacities of the supercomputers. In other cases the dynamical
equations are chaotic, i.e. display extreme sensitivity to the initial conditions, which puts a limit
in the predictive power independent of the computers. We are used to these limitations and
have found ways to deal with them, estimating the uncertainties in the predictions and looking
for more powerful methods to reduce them.
But there are some mathematical equations which do not have any algorithm which can be
used to solve them. A beautiful example is given by the following problem in number theory:
Does the equation
∑
aijk...x
iyjzk... = 0, xi, ai ∈ Z, which is a polynomial equation with integer
coefficients, have roots in the integers? It has been proved in [11] that there is no algorithm to
answer this question. It is incomputable. No computer can answer it.
An interesting connection of this problem with quantum physics is offered in [23]. It is
suggested to evaluate the square of the left hand side of the previous equation, which will then
be always equal or greater than zero. It can be interpreted as a Hamiltonian, where the integer
numbers are associated with photon numbers. If a physical realization of this Hamiltonian can
be constructed, measuring the ground state energy of the system would provide an answer, if it
is zero, to the integer values of x, y, z, .. which are the solutions, proving their existence. There
are many subtle points in this proposal, which can be explored in [23].
Are there relevant problems in physics belonging to this category? Examples of undecidability
and incompleteness results in classical analysis within a sufficiently rich axiom system can be
extended to undecidability and incompleteness results in axiomatized formulations of physics.
Many undecidability and incompleteness results deal with the integrability of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations, and with the possibility of proving that a given dynamical system has a chaotic
behavior [24].
Consider the following question: Given a quantum many-body Hamiltonian, is the system it
describes gapped or gapless? It is perhaps the simplest and most relevant question in condensed
matter, and can be rephrased into the mass problem in quantum field theory. For a finite
number of components (like spins in a Heisenberg chain), the solution can be numerically found.
The challenge is to find the thermodynamic limit, when the number of components tends to
infinity. It has recently been shown that “this problem is undecidable, in the same sense as
the Halting Problem was proven to be undecidable by Turing. A consequence of this is that
the spectral gap of certain quantum many-body Hamiltonians is not determined by the axioms
of mathematics, much as Godels incompleteness theorem implies that certain theorems are
mathematically unprovable.”[25]
This is a really interesting situation. One is invited to consider the possibility to solve
problems which are demonstrated to be incomputable, for whom it has been proved the
impossibility to compute even the existence of a solution, by employing physical systems which
exactly map the problem into an experimental setting. Measuring the output would provide
the answer. In a way it would be a return to analogous computation. In fact, the digital
computation we employ daily also employs programs which are written in bits, each having
a physical realization in the computer. The difference is that in the usual case we could, in
principle, perform by hand the same computation. To solve incomputable problems using devices
which are not equivalent to Universal Turing Machines is the proposal of a research area called
hypercomputation [26]. The possibility of effectively employing it in solving problems seems at
the present very far away.
We can go further an apply this kind of ideas to measurement itself. The “physical variables”
that we use are always considered as results of procedures that we can perform to measure
them. Are this procedures algorithmic? We have algorithmic procedures to measure many
physical quantities like distance or voltage (with some limitations). The creation or invention of
the procedure is not algorithmic but, once it is written, every trained person having the proper
equipment could perform it following a list of instructions. Can we imagine a “physical variable”
whose process of measurement is not algorithmic? If we have a variable whose process is not
algorithmic there should be no fixed list of instructions to measure it. This may seem unreal
but take a Turing machine and suppose we want to measure if this machine will halt or not,
there is no algorithm to do that, the only option to know the answer is to seat and wait.
5. Conclusion
The relation between physics and randomness is indeed rich, being randomness quite complicated
by itself. Being considered in the past a curiosity or a metaphysical question outside of physics,
the developments in the last decades in quantum optics an quantum information, in particular
the applications of individual measurements of quantum systems to random number generation
and security, have brought them to a central stage.
There are very interesting questions about the meaning in physics of concepts like law,
pattern, and their computability. These questions are not only related with the results of
measurements but with some central elements of physics like “physical variables”.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful for the contributions of Bogdan Mielnik to illuminate the dark side of
quantum mechanics. This work was supported in part by Conacyt, Mexico. AS is a fellow of
Conacyt, Mexico.
References
[1] 2014 Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 47 number 42
[2] Wiseman H 2014 Nature. 510 467–469
[3] Zeilinger A 1999 Foundations of Physics, 29 631–643
[4] Scarani V 2010 Nature 464 988–989
[5] Pironio et al S 2010 Nature 464 1021–1024
[6] Christensen B G, McCusker K T, Altepeter J B, Calkins B, Gerrits T, Lita A E, Miller A, Shalm L K, Zhang
Y, Nam S W, Brunner N, Lim C C W, Gisin N and Kwiat P G 2013 Phys. Rev. Lett. 111 130406
[7] Bancal J D, Sheridan L and Scarani V 2014 New J. Phys. 16 033011
[8] Nieto-Silleras O, Pironio S and Silman J 2014 New J. Phys. 16 013035
[9] Chaitin G 2006 Scientific American March 74–81
[10] Turing A 1937 Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 230–265
[11] Davis M 1953 Computability and Unsolvability (Dover)
[12] Calude C 2002 Information and Randomness: An Algorithmic Perspective 2nd ed (Secaucus, NJ, USA:
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.) ISBN 3540434666
[13] Li M and Vitnyi P M 2008 An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications 3rd ed (Springer
Publishing Company, Incorporated) ISBN 0387339981, 9780387339986
[14] Lopez-Ortiz A 1998 How to compute digits of pi? URL https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/{\raise.17ex\hbox{$\
scriptstyle\sim$}}alopez-o/math-faq/mathtext/node12.html
[15] Zeilinger A 2005 Nature 438 743
[16] Bell J S and Aspect A 2004 Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge University
Press) pp 232–248 2nd ed ISBN 9780511815676 cambridge Books Online URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1017/CBO9780511815676.026
[17] Kochen S and Specker E 1975 The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics (The University of
Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science vol 5a) ed Hooker C (Springer Netherlands) pp 293–328
ISBN 978-90-277-0613-3 URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1795-4_17
[18] Nieto-Silleras O, Pironio S and Silman J 2014 New Journal of Physics 16 013035 URL http://stacks.iop.
org/1367-2630/16/i=1/a=013035
[19] Bancal J D, Sheridan L and Scarani V 2014 New Journal of Physics 16 033011 URL http://stacks.iop.
org/1367-2630/16/i=3/a=033011
[20] Calude C 1994 in G. Rozenberg, A. Salomaa (eds.) Developments in Language Theory 113–129
[21] Calude C S, Dinneen M J, Dumitrescu M and Svozil K 2010 Phys. Rev. A 82(2) 022102 URL http:
//link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.82.022102
[22] Solis A, Angulo Mart´ınez A M, Ramı´rez-Alarco´n R, Cruz-Ramı´rez H, U’Ren A B and Hirsch J G 2015
Physica Scripta in press
[23] Kieu T D 2003 Int.J.Theor.Phys. 42 1461–1478
[24] da Costa N C and Doria F A 1991 International Journal of Theoretical Physics 30 1041–1073
[25] Cubitt T, Perez-Garcia D and Wolf M M 2015 arXiv [quant-ph] 1502.04135
[26] Copeland B J and Proudfoot D 1999 Scientific American April 98–103
